



POST-DEPLOYMENT BRIEF WESTPAC 04-2

**Commanding Officer:
Colonel T.C. Greenwood**



AGENDA

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- COMPOSITION / ASSIGNMENT TO SHIPPING
- TIMELINE
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING
- DEPLOYMENT
 - OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE
 - THEATER RESERVE MISSION
 - SUSTAINMENT TRAINING
 - CONTINGENCY PLANNING
 - DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTH BAGHDAD (ISO OIF III)
- ESG CONCEPT
- READINESS
 - PERSONNEL
 - LOGISTICS
 - AVIATION
- SUMMARY
- PENDING ISSUES



15TH MEU(SOC) ORGANIZATION

**COMMAND
ELEMENT**
Col T.C. Greenwood
31 Officers
175 Enlisted

Total Personnel:
2160

BLT 1/1
LtCol D. Furness
Officers: 60
Enlisted: 1138

HMM 165(REIN)
LtCol E.B. Steidl
Officers: 71
Enlisted: 408

MSSG 15
LtCol J. Hatton
Officers: 16
Enlisted: 261



COMPOSITION / ASSIGNMENT TO SHIPPING



**LHD 6 USS BONHOMME
RICHARD**

CE: 15th MEU

- Force Recon Plt
- Det, 9th Comm
- Dets, Rad Bn & Intel Bn

GCE: BLT 1/1 (-)


- H&S Co
- C Co (Helo)
- T Btry (rein) 5/11
- 1st LAR (4 vehicles)
- Wpns Co (-)
- Div Recon Plt

ACE: HMM-165 (-) (REIN)

- 12 X CH-46E
- 4 X CH-53E
- 4 X AH-1W
- 3 X UH-1N
- 6 X AV-8B

CSSE: Det, MSSG-15

Pre-boat: 3 LCAC
LAVs / Wpns CO & BLT HQ



LPD 6 USS DULUTH

GCE: Det, BLT 1/1

- B Co (boat/helo)
- H&S Co det
- CEB plt

ACE: Det HMM-165 (-)(REIN)

- 3 X CH-46E (when required)

CSSE: MSSG-15 (-)

- Det HQ
- Det, Comm
- Det, Engineer
- Det, Health Services
- Det, Maintenance
- Det, Military Police
- Det, TS
- Det, Supply
- Det, LFSP

Pre-boat: 1 LCU
LFSP / BMU



**LSD 47 USS
RUSHMORE**

GCE: Det, BLT 1/1

- A Co (mech)
- H&S Co det
- 1st Plt (rein), E Co, 3d AA Bn
- 1st Tank Bn (4 tanks)
- Det, Wpns Co./ CAAT

CSSE: DET, MSSG-15


- Det, HQ
- Det, Engineer
- Det, Maintenance
- Det, Supply
- Det, TS

Pre-boat: 2 LCAC
CAAT / CLZ TEAM




TIMELINE

2004




2005





DEPLOYMENT TRANSITS





EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Before deploying, **trained hard** in amphibious raids and conventional core competencies across the spectrum of conflict.
- Served as the Rapid Response MAGTF as part of Expeditionary Strike Group-5 (except when in IRAQ)
- Participated in Humanitarian Assistance operations in Sri Lanka and Indonesia (**OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE**)
- Participated in counter-insurgency operations in South Baghdad (**OIF III**)
- Served as USCENTCOM afloat **theatre reserve**
- Conducted **Arabic language training afloat** during transit to theatre
- More than 600 Marines and Sailors **completed afloat college courses**
- **All 2160 Marines/Sailors returned home safely**



PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING PERIOD

- **GENERAL**

- JUNE - DECEMBER 2004

- **MAJOR FACTORS**

- BLT 1/1 RETURNED FROM 13TH MEU (SOC) DEPLOYMENT MARCH 2004
- HMM-165 "BILL PAYER" FOR 3D MAW OIF I/II
- NO MISSION CLARITY
- ASSUMED IRAQ IMMINENT

- **PTP: STATUS QUO "ENHANCED"**

- SASO AT MARCH AFB (MAY 2004)
- RCAX AT 29 PALMS (JUNE 2004)
- MAGTF TRUE AT GEORGE AFB (AUGUST 2004)
- ADVANCED MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING FOR BLT
- RAID LEADERS COURSE
- BOAT RAID COURSE AT EWTGPAC (BUT NO SOTG COURSE)





- AFATDS AND C2 SYSTEMS TRAINING AT EWTGPAC
- EXPEDITIONARY FIRES COORDINATION CENTER (EFCC) UPGRADES ON LHD-6
- SUCESSFULLY ACHIEVED DIGITAL FIRES LINK FROM SENSOR (UAV) TO SHOOTER ON SCI
- ENHANCED FIRE-EX INTEGRATED W/ MANEUVER ON SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND DURING ALL AT-SEA PERIODS



- EARLY INTEGRATION
- COMBINED R2P2 (MEU/PHIBRON/ESG)
- MAX GREEN PARTICIPATION IN BLUE WARGAMES/TABLE TOP
- AOR VISIT
- SOCIAL EVENTS





PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING PERIOD

- **AGGRESSIVE TRAINING W/ NON-ORGANIC AVIATION ASSETS**

- P-3
- UAV
- AH-60B HAWKLINK
- F-18
- KC-130R



- **CONVENTIONAL TRAINING ASHORE DURING AT-SEA PERIODS**

- “RAIDERS” STILL HAVE TO MASTER CONVENTIONAL CORE COMPETENCIES
- MINIMIZE DOWN TIME AFLOAT WAITING FOR NEXT EVENT





PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING PERIOD

CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS

- INSTITUTIONALIZE RCAX
- INSTITUTIONALIZE MAGTF TRUE (VICE TRUE ONLY FOR MSPF/ACE)
- CONSIDER REDUCING ACE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR EVERY RAID COURSE
 - IS RWCAS/MEDEVAC NEEDED FOR ALL RAID COURSES?
- CONSIDER PROGRESSIVE SPECIAL OPERATIONS CERTIFICATION (BY EVENT VICE 3D AT-SEA BEING SINGLE GRADED EVENT)
- CONTINUE LIVE FIRE AND CONVENTIONAL UNIT TRAINING ASHORE DURING AT-SEA PERIODS
- IMPROVE QUALITY OF ROLE PLAYERS FOR NEO / HA



OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE

- **GENERAL**

- 28 DECEMBER - 19 JANUARY

- **GUAM SUSTAINMENT TRAINING**
CANCELLED - MAKE "BEST SPEED" TO SRI LANKA

- **VICINITY OF SINGAPORE**


- INDONESIA DESIGNATED "MAIN EFFORT"
 - CONDUCT "DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS" (E.G. INDONESIA & SRI LANKA SIMULTANEOUSLY)
 - MAGTF/PHIBRON RECONFIGURED TO SUPPORT DISTRIBUTED OPS

- **FORWARD DEPLOYED NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCES**

- RESPONSIVE
 - AGILE
 - RELEVANT

- **SEABASING** MITIGATED HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES ABOUT LARGE U.S. FOOTPRINT ASHORE

- **ART OF BEING USEFUL** W/OUT BECOMING A NUISANCE OR MAJOR POLITICAL LIABILITY





OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE

- **OPERATIONAL REACH UNPRECEDENTED**

- 2 COUNTRIES SIMULTANEOUSLY
- 200 MILE RADIUS ON SUMATRA (INDONESIA)
- INTEGRATED AIR/SURFACE CRAFT OPERATIONS

- **SIMULTANEOUS SUPPORT:** INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES, COALITION PARTNERS, AND NGO'S

- **EFFECTS** MORE IMPORTANT THAN NUMBER OF "BOOTS ON THE GROUND"

- SMALL LNO TEAMS AT KEY NODES
- WATER DISTRIBUTION TEAM
- MEDICAL/DENTAL ASSIST TEAMS
- WORKING PARTIES TO OFF-LOAD SUPPLIES
- SUPPORTED COALITION PARTNERS (FRENCH/SPANISH)





OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE

▪ MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

➤ WEIGHT OF DELIVERED SUPPLIES

- 2,155,000 (35% BY MEU) lbs
- 105,050 lbs Medical Supplies

➤ TOTAL AIR SORTIES

- 412 (53% BY MEU)
- 318 PALLETS

➤ TOTAL SURFACE MISSIONS

- 21 (33% BY MEU)
- 232 PALLETS

➤ (2) CIVILIAN MEDEVACS

➤ (6) MEDCAP/DENTCAPS





OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE

CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS

- SUSTAIN SPEED-TO-EXECUTION
- SUSTAIN OPERATIONAL REACH (URBAN/RURAL)
- SUSTAIN SUPPORTING COALITION PARTNERS, HOST NATION AND NGO'S
- SUSTAIN PRO-ACTIVE PA/IO
- SUSTAIN ACCOMODATING POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES
- LAND BASE AV-8B'S SO THEY DON'T LOSE QUALIFICATIONS
- HIGHER HEADQUARTERS USE JTF-ENABLER ASHORE OR LFOC AFLOAT FOR IMPROVED COMMS
- ESG COMMANDER AS POTENTIAL JTF COMMANDER





THEATER RESERVE AFLOAT

- **GENERAL**

- 23 JANUARY - 22 APRIL (LESS 30 DAYS IN BAGHDAD)

- **12 HOUR** RESPONSE REQUIREMENT - FORWARD COMMAND ELEMENT (FCE)

- **72 HOUR** RESPONSE REQUIREMENT - MAIN BODY

- **BPT MISSIONS** W/OUT PRIORITIZATION

- CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

- NEO

- SUPPORT TO MNF-I

- SUPPORT TO CFC-A

- PRESENCE OPERATIONS

- MIO/MSO

- HA/CMO





THEATER RESERVE AFLOAT

- NO CLEAR GUIDANCE ON **MEU (SOC) MISSION PROFILES**
 - TRAP
 - PLATOON/COMPANY SIZE REINFORCEMENT
 - MASSCAS
 - MSPF DIRECT ACTION
 - MSPF VBSS
 - ENBC
 - NEO
- WILLINGNESS TO LET **MAGTF TRAIN ASHORE** SO LONG AS CAPABILITY SETS REMAIN AFLOAT
 - HOW MUCH AFLOAT IS ENOUGH?





THEATER RESERVE AFLOAT

CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS

- PRIORITIZE THEATER RESERVE MISSIONS/TASKS
- DEFINE REQUIREMENT FOR MEU(SOC) MISSION PROFILES (ALERT CONDITIONS)
- MAGTF TRAINING/OPERATIONS ASHORE NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH RESERVE MISSION
- TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FLIGHT DECK LIMITATIONS (ONLY 12 HOURS A DAY)
- MEU'S ENBC CAPABILITY MISPERCEIVED AS AFLOAT CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE FORCE (CBIRF), CAPABLE OF CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS / REGIONAL LEVEL



SUSTAINMENT TRAINING

- **GENERAL**

- 14 FEBRUARY – 4 MARCH

- HARD REQUIREMENT VICE “NICE TO HAVE”
- 45 DAY TRANSIT
- TRAINING READINESS ATROPHIES NO MATTER HOW AGGRESSIVE SHIPBOARD TRAINING
- CAMP BUEHRING / UDARI RANGES IN KUWAIT – TOP NOTCH





SUSTAINMENT TRAINING

CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS

- PLAN FOR SUSTAINMENT TRAINING EARLY IN PARTNERSHIP WITH NAVY
- DISPATCH ADVON EARLY
- IDENTIFY TRAINING AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS EARLY AND COORDINATE W/ MARCENT
- SUSTAINMENT TRAINING: MAGTF VICE BLT EVENT





CONTINGENCY PLANNING

- **GENERAL**

- 23 JANUARY – 4 MARCH

- **SEIZE THE MOMENT:** WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR MEU'S TO CONCURRENTLY SERVE AS THEATER RESERVE, CONDUCT SUSTAINMENT TRAINING ASHORE AND EXECUTE LITTORAL OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ

- **DEVELOPED CONOPS TO SECURE COMMERCIAL DREDGING OPERATIONS IN KAA WATERWAY**






CONTINGENCY PLANNING

■ DEVELOPED CONOPS TO SUPPORT MND-SE

- SUSTAINED ISR (GROUND/AIR)
- MISSION SETS
 - CASEVAC/MEDEVAC
 - AVIATION SUPPORT TO PROTECT OIL INFRASTRUCTURE
 - GROUND SUPPORT TO PROTECT OIL INFRASTRUCTURE
 - CROSS TRAINING WITH MND-SE FORCES AND SUPPORT TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
 - CLOSE AIR SUPPORT/TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY SUPPORT TO MND-SE OPERATIONS
- INSERTED LNO AT MND-SE





CONTINGENCY PLANNING

CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS

- ESG-5 BATTELSpace SHOULD INCLUDE LITTORALS, MND-SE; MEU(SOC) LITTORAL OPERATIONS SHOULD BE THE NORM NOT THE EXCEPTION
- STRENGTHENING LAND-SEA INTERFACE IN SOUTHERN IRAQ WILL HELP REDUCE SMUGGLING, PIRACY, TERRORIST FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, AND TROOP-TO-TASK SHORTAGE IN OIF III





DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTH BAGHDAD

- **GENERAL**


- 8 MARCH - 10 APRIL

- **TACON** TO 3D INFANTRY DIVISION AND 256 BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT)

- **ACE TACON** TO 2D MAW

- “HANDCON” ALLOWED FOR DS RELATIONSHIP W/ 15TH MEU
 - AL TAQADAM: CH-46 AND H-1’S
 - AL ASAD: CH-53 AND AV-8B’S

- **FOB FALCON:** CE, BLT, MSSG, AND ACE ALERT PACKAGE





DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTH BAGHDAD

▪ **BATTLESPACE**

- 350 SQ KM
- BOUNDED BY ROUTE TAMPA AND TIGRIS RIVER
- ENEMY SANCTUARY

▪ **MISSION:** LOCATE INSURGENTS AND DEGRADE / DISRUPT

▪ **TACTICAL APPROACH:** DENY ENEMY FREEDOM OF ACTION; AVOID WEAPON OF CHOICE (IED/VBIED)

- HELICOPTERS
- DISMOUNTED INFANTRY
- 24/7 PRESENCE – AVOID FOB MENTALITY
- MULTI-DIMENSIONAL/SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS





DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTH BAGHDAD

▪ TACTICAL ACTIVITIES

➤ INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS	5
➤ IED' S DISCOVERED/RENDERED SAFE	31
➤ IED ATTACKS	2
➤ CACHES DISCOVERED	15
➤ DETAINEES TAKEN	62
HVT'S	9
➤ MSPF RAIDS	13
➤ CORDON AND KNOCK/SEARCH	413
➤ PATROLS	339
VEHICLE	121
FOOT	218
➤ VEHICLE CHECKPOINTS	190
➤ VEHICLE INSPECTIONS	618
➤ HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS	7



DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTH BAGHDAD

▪ MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

- FEWER INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS ON CHECKPOINTS AND BAGHDAD IZ
- FEWER IED ATTACKS AT MIXING BOWL AND ALONG ROUTE TAMPA
- HVT'S/INSURGENTS CAPTURED ACROSS THE BATTLESPACE
- CACHES DISCOVERED AND DESTROYED
- REDUCED ENEMY'S FREEDOM OF ACTION
- NO CATASTROPHIC IED DETONATION
- LOCAL POPULACE WARMED TO MARINE PRESENCE
- MINIMAL FRIENDLY CAUSALITIES





DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTH BAGHDAD

CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS

- **ARMY EQUIPMENT UPGRADES**
CONTRIBUTED TO OUR MISSION SUCCESS
 - LEVEL 1 ARMORED HMMWV (83)
 - BLUE FORCE TRACKERS W/ COC TERMINAL (8)
 - WARLOCK (5)
 - PSYOPS (1 TM X 2)
 - CIVIL AFFAIRS (1 TM X 2)
 - INTERPRETERS (25)
- **MEU(SOC)'S MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION** TO SHORT DURATION OIF OPERATIONS





DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTH BAGHDAD

CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS (CONT)

- PRE-DEPLOYMENT **TRAINING WITH NON-ORGANIC AVIATION ASSETS** FACILITATED OUR SUCCESS WITH JOINT AIR
 - EA-6B SPOTLIGHT
 - AC-130
 - UAV
 - F-16
 - F-18
 - P3C/AIP
- **SPEED TO EXECUTION** NOTEWORTHY--BY PRODUCT OF R2P2 AND PTP
- **SNIPERS, EOD, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE** DECISIVE VICE SHAPING/SUPPORTING OPERATIONS
- **24/7 OPERATIONS IN BATTLESPACE** MORE EFFECTIVE THAN OPERATING FROM FOB





ESG CONCEPT (WEST COAST MODEL)

- **ADVANTAGES OUTWEIGH DISADVANTAGES**

- ENHANCES SURVIVABILITY OF ARG-MEU.
- INCREASED CAPACITY TO CONDUCT MULT-DIMENSIONAL WARFARE.
- FO/GO MAY SERVE AS JTF COMMANDER AFLOAT OR ASHORE.
- ESG STAFF MAY SERVE AS NUCLEUS FOR JTF STAFF.
- ESG MORE ADEPT AT HANDLING INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS/CONDUCTED INFORMATION WARFARE THAN ARG-MEU.
- FO/GO.ESG COMMANDER HAS MORE CLOUT WITH THEATRE COMBATANT COMMANDERS.
- FO/GO ESG COMMANDER ENJOYS INCREASED STATURE IN COMBINED/JOINT WORLD.
- ALLOWS MEU/PHIBRON COMMANDERS TO FIGHT THE TACTICAL FIGHT WHILE ESG FOCUSES ON BIGGER BATTLE.



READINESS

- PERSONNEL
- LOGISTICS
- AVIATION



PERSONNEL

MSE	<i>JUN 04</i>	<i>AUG 04</i>	<i>DEC 04</i>	<i>APR 05</i>	<i>JUN 05</i>
1/1					
T/O 937	641	784 (756 Dep)	885	878	870
S/G 765	84%	99%	116%	115%	114%
MSSG-15					
T/O 267	285	268 (268 Dep)	277		
S/G 267	107%	100%	104%		
HMM-165					
T/O 166	212	156 (145 Dep)	158		
S/G 149	142%	104%	106%		

- Reinforcements for BLT and ACE: 100% S/G
- Corpsmen - BLT had 22 deployable in July, (rated 54)
 - 15 corpsmen arrived after SOCEX and all training was complete
- Although S/G was met in Aug for 03XXs, 03XX T/O is 639 and BLT had 586 deployable (92%)
- 32 of the inbound 03XXs in July had an estimated date of arrival after TRUE/BUST/SASO training at SCLA (George AFB)
- 5 Pilots were cross-decked from HMM-163 after its return with 13th MEU in March to get HMM-165 to complete manning levels



PERSONNEL

<u>UNIT</u>	Redeployed from			
	Kuwait (mid April)	Australia (mid May)	Hawaii (end of May)	Emergency Leave CONUS TEMP/ PERM
CE	1 orders	1 orders	0	5 / 7
BLT 1/1	7 6 EAS, 1 orders	4 2 EAS, 2 orders	0	9 / 6
HMM-165	2 orders	1 EAS possible	0	3 / 3
MSSG 15	0	1 orders	2 orders	2 / 0
TOTAL	10	7	2	19 / 16

ATTRITION

BLT brought 10 Marines with EAS's within 30 days after return

BLT Recon was told by parent Bn that 10 of the detachment's 20 Marines would be re-deploying to Iraq in Sept.

ACE had 1 officer (AV-8B pilot) with an EAS of 1 June that was established after deploying




LOGISTICS

- **Made “Reach Back” work** on Class IX Parts Block
 - Deployed with 45% fewer items
 - No Degradation in Readiness – Maintenance 94% or greater
- **Made Sea-based Logistics work:**
 - Achieved 40% “fill rate” during Kuwait Sustainment Training (average for MEU’s 20% or less)
 - Used Navy Fleet Intergrated Supply Centers (FISC) to **reduce “customer” wait time (CWT) from 15 days to 4 days**
- MSSG-15 nominated as Marine Corps Logistics Unit of 2004




LOGISTICS

1. If the part not in IX Block, Supply Det checks, passes requirement to MSSG Expeditor at CAMPEN.
2. If part O/H MSSG Expeditor walks through at SMU/PP&P – if not in stock (NIS) Expeditor contacts DLA rep in Columbus who ships direct to Expeditor or to theater.
3. If the part O/H Expeditor drives part to North Island via 3-Ton or uses CAMPEN pick-up (M,W, Sat). Expeditor then completes the DD1149 w/ transportation accounting code (TAC) to fund shipping. Expeditor contacts Supply Det aboard BHR w/ listing of gear that was shipped.
4. Part is shipped via FISC and tracked by Logistics Support Rep (LSR), delivered to ESG via CLF shipping, UNREP, etc. MSSG Supply will be embedded with Navy aboard BHR and track part via 1-touch. MSSG will have visibility of shipping schedule.





AVIATION



CNO/CMC GOALS:

MC-84.0%, FMC-77.0%

HMM-165 (REIN) DEPLOYED:

MC-72.8%, FMC-60.7%



AVIATION READINESS POINTS

- **HMM-165 pre-deployment period**
 - **Squadron transferred 17 CH-46's during 12 month period prior to deployment.**
 - Full Mission Capable aircraft transferred TO next deploying unit.
 - Non-mission capable / non-deployable aircraft received FROM next deploying unit.
 - **Aircraft upgrades and modifications conducted on ALL CH-46's and CH-53's.**
 - ASE upgrade and ECCS modifications on CH-46's (3-4 weeks per aircraft)
 - Last CH-46E was completed two weeks prior to deploy date.
 - ASE upgrade on CH-53E's (1-2 weeks per aircraft)
 - **Short period between JTFEX and deploy date precluded a dedicated aircraft groom period.**



AVIATION READINESS POINTS

- **HMM-165 deployment period**

- **Impact of OIF felt across 3D MAW (rear)**

- All deployed squadron's were (FAD-2) priority for parts.
- Reduced parts availability in the rear
 - Increased Cannibalization Rates
 - Longer wait for High Usage/High Demand Components

- **AIRPAC and AIRLANT combined** to form COMNAVAIRFORCES (CNAF).

- All aviation supply issues managed from East Coast
 - Different model for AVCAL/CAVCAL allowancing
 - BHR AVCAL/CAVCAL built using West Coast (COMNAVSURFPAC) model
- This was the first deployment for this concept

- **Extended supply lines** between CONUS and NAG

- Reliance upon CLF ships for resupply after Hawaii (vcty Guam and Singapore)
- Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE saw challenge of hi op-temp while at the end of an extended supply line.

- Squadron **benefited from mature (supply) theater** once ashore in Iraq.



SUMMARY

- MEU'S ARE STILL THE "JEWEL OF THE CROWN"
- TRANSIT TIME FOR WEST COAST MEU'S AN "ACHILLES HEEL"
- SHIP INSTALLS AND C412 UPGRADES NEED STREAMLINING
- UNDERTAKE LITTORAL OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ
- SEA BASING: NO LONGER AN EMERGING CONCEPT
- SUSTAINMENT TRAINING IS A REQUIREMENT NOT A LUXURY
- EQUIPMENT AUGMENTATION PACKAGE IN KUWAIT A MUST FOR MEU'S GOING INTO IRAQ



PENDING ISSUES

- READINESS OF UNITS AT IN-CHOP TO MEU'S
- POST-DEPLOYMENT R-DAY TO R+30 READINESS REQUIREMENTS
- MEU-ANGLICO SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP
- AV-8B REMOTE RECEIVER STATION (RRS) TO RECEIVE DOWN LINKED STREAM VIDEO ABOARD LHD / LHA
- FAC SUITES ORGANIC TO MEU'S